READ THE LAST SENTENCE CAREFULLY ...What Goodbody said about competition on taxi fares
Goodbody explicitly identified “Fare Competition” as an effect of the liberalised taxi market. Their conclusion was that there was evidence of lower fares being offered to consumers, particularly outside Dublin. They identified three forms of competition:
Fixed flat-rate fares for short journeys
Waiving of booking fees
Discounts on longer journeys
Importantly, Goodbody did not regard this as a problem in itself. They said that the national fare structure established maximum fares, rather than mandatory fares, so operators could legitimately offer discounts. They noted that this had actually been possible for many years before liberalisation.
The important qualification was that a flat-rate fare could not legitimately be higher than the applicable metered fare, because that would breach the national maximum-fare regulations.
The broader point
So, if you're looking at whether Goodbody believed competition was working to restrain taxi prices, the answer is yes, to an extent. They observed actual price competition, particularly outside Dublin, rather than concluding that liberalisation simply resulted in higher fares.
However, there is an interesting distinction: competition between taxis did not necessarily mean the headline regulated maximum fare would fall. The maximum fare was a ceiling, while operators could compete underneath it through discounts and different pricing arrangements.
Goodbody also found that the national maximum-fare structure made fares easier for consumers to understand and that there was evidence consumers considered the post-reform structure better value for money.
